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Plaintiffs and Appellants Phillip A. Alf and Kathryn B. Alf 
(Alfs) submit this Reply Brief in response to Defendant and 
Appellee State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's (State Farm) Brief 
of Respondent. The majority of State Farm's arguments raised in 
its brief are addressed in Alfs1 original brief. However, Alfs 
will here amplify certain points and draw the Court's attention to 
several inaccuracies in the application of law contained in State 
Farm's brief in order to clarity the issues and define the proper 
resolution of these issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
1. Plaintiffs are individuals, husband and wife, residing in 
the City of Draper, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company is a 
corporation licensed and authorized to conduct insurance business 
in the State of Utah. 
3. On or about March 8, 1988, Plaintiffs, through 
Defendant's agent, Fred R. Jensen, purchased a home owners policy 
of insurance on their home and premises in Draper, Utah. 
4. At all times material hereto, said policy was in effect. 
5. On or about February 15, 1989, while said policy was in 
full force and effect, and during a time when the home was fully 
occupied by Plaintiffs and not under construction, the main water 
line to the home, in an area where it runs under the tennis court 
on said premises, and through the residence of the Plaintiffs, 
^hese facts are taken verbatim from the January 17, 1990, 
Stipulated Statements of Fact, R. 40-41 (Stipulated Facts). 
froze and burst as a result of unusually low temperatures occurring 
in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
6. As a result of the freezing and bursting of the main 
water line, large volumes of water escaped from the water line 
causing extensive flooding and washing away of the earth under the 
tennis court, driveway, fences and other structures on Plaintiffs' 
premises and causing damage to those structures. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred, as a matter of law, in its summary 
judgment ruling because Village Inn v. State Farm is not 
determinative of the issue of law before this Court because it does 
not address efficient proximate cause. Alfs advanced the efficient 
proximate cause argument in the lower court, the lower court based 
its summary judgment ruling entirely on the Village Inn case, and 
Village Inn does not address the issue of efficient proximate 
cause. According to the stipulated Statement of Facts and the 
Findings of Facts, the efficient proximate cause is the "freezing 
and bursting of the main water line." 
Further, summary judgment as decided, was improper because the 
determination of efficient proximate cause is a factual issue 
properly decided by the trier of fact. Efficient proximate cause 
is the law in Utah, the determination of efficient proximate cause 
is a matter for the trier of fact, and the stipulation of the 
parties does not support a determination that earth movement was 
the efficient proximate cause. Therefore, Summary Judgment as 




The Lower Court Erred, as a Matter of Law, in 
its Summary Judgment Ruling because Village 
Inn v. State Farm is Not Determinative of the 
Issue of Law Before This Court Because it Does 
Not Address Efficient Proximate Cause 
Alfs requested that the Lower Court apply the efficient 
proximate cause rule to resolve the relevant issue: Did earth 
movement cause the damage or was the damage caused by the "freezing 
and bursting of the main water line." In other words, where one 
cause ("freezing of a plumbing . . . or sprinkler system"2) is 
covered and the other possible cause ("earth movement"3) was 
excluded, which was the efficient proximate cause? Even though 
there is ample basis in the Statement of Facts to make a finding of 
fact and conclusion of law that the "freezing and bursting of the 
main water line" was the efficient proximate cause, the Lower Court 
side-stepped this issue, made no finding of fact or conclusion of 
law relating to efficient proximate cause, and based its ruling 
entirely on the Village Inn case—a case which does not even 
address efficient proximate cause. 
A. Alfs Advanced the Efficient Proximate Cause 
Argument in the Lower Court 
Alfs argued in their Opposition Memorandum at Summary 
Judgment4 and again in their Brief on Appeal5 that the efficient 
2Home Owner's Extra Policy, §I-Losses Insured, 514. 
3Home Owner's Extra Policy, Si-Losses Not Insured, 12b. 
4March 26, 1990, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, pp. 17-20. 
3 
proximate cause of the damage was "the freezing and bursting of the 
main water line."6 
The parties have stipulated: 
As a result of the freezing and bursting of 
the main water line, large volumes of water 
escaped from the water line causing extensive 
flooding and washing away of soil undermining 
the tennis court, driveway, fences and other 
structures on Plaintiffs' premises and causing 
damage thereto.7 
B. The Lower Court Based its Summary Judgment 
Ruling Entirely on the Village Inn case 
It is also undisputed that the lower court squarely rested its 
Summary Judgment ruling on the Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Company8 case. The lower court concluded, as a 
matter of law: 
The Court finds that the case of Village Inn 
Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company, 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 92, is governing 
and there is no coverage for Plaintiffs' 
losses and Defendant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.9 
C_s Village Inn Does Not Address the Issue of 
Efficient Proximate Cause 
However, Village Inn does not address efficient proximate 
cause. Village Inn does not even mention the phrases "efficient 
proximate cause" or "proximate cause." 
5Brief on Appeal, pp. 9, 12-13. 
Stipulated Facts, 56. 
7Id. 
8790 P .2d 581 (Utah App. 1 9 9 0 ) . 
9November 14 , 1990 , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, 5 1 . 
4 
Simply put, the lower court erred in its reliance upon Village 
Inn as a basis for granting Summary Judgment in favor of State 
Farm. The unresolved and unaddressed relevant issue is whether the 
"predominant or efficient proximate cause of the loss was the 
accidental freezing and bursting of the plumbing system,"10 which, 
it is undisputed, is a peril clearly covered by the policy: 
SECTION I - LOSSES INSURED 
COVERAGE B - PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We insure for accidental direct physical loss 
to property described in coverage B caused by 
the following perils, except as provided in 
SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED: 
• . • 
14, Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning or automatic fire protective 
sprinkler system, or a house-hold appliance11. 
P. According to the Stipulated Statement of Facts 
and the Findings of Fact, the Efficient Proximate 
Cause is the "Freezing and Bursting of the 
Main Water Line" 
There can be no question as to what caused and the other 
secondary causes and set them in motion in this case. The 
Stipulated Facts recite, "As a result of the freezing and bursting 
of the main water line . . . " soil washed away. Therefore, the 
proximate cause of the damage—as stipulated by the parties—was 
the frozen and broken pipes. The frozen and broken pipes caused 
and set in motion in the other subsequent and secondary causes 
which—although they were closer to the damage—were nevertheless 
"a result" of the broken and frozen pipes. 
10March 26, 1990, Opposition Memorandum, p. 17. 
"November 14, 1990, Findings of Fact, Ex. A, Your State Farm 
Homeowners Extra Policy. 
5 
The issue of efficient proximate cause is not new to the 
courts and, accordingly, several cases have dealt with it. 
For example, in a recent case, State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company v. Von Per Lieth,12 the homeowners asserted that their "all 
risk" policy should cover loss due to third party negligence. 
However, State Farm claimed the more immediate cause of the damage 
was earth movement and water damage, both items excluded under the 
policy. In the Van Per Lieth case, there were "several causes of 
the loss: (i) earth movement caused by rising ground water levels, 
and (ii) negligence of certain entities parties in failing to take 
proper measures to preserve the mesa."13 The California Supreme 
Court, in reversing its Court of Appeals and holding for the 
homeowners, stated: 
When a loss is caused by a combination of a covered and 
specifically excluded risks, the loss is covered if the 
covered risk is the efficient proximate cause of loss. . 
. . [T]he loss is not covered if the covered risk was 
only a remote cause of the loss, or the excluded risk was 
the efficient proximate, or predominate cause.14 
Once again, the stipulated facts of the case which is now before 
this Court state that the efficient proximate cause—the "as a 
result" cause—was the freezing the bursting of the main water 
line, which cause is a covered peril. Therefore, according to the 
Van Per Lieth rationale, Alfs* damages should be covered under the 
12
 2 Calf. Rptr. 2d 183 (Calf. 1991). 
13Id. at 189. 
14Id. at 189. 
6 
policy because a covered peril, a frozen and broken water line, was 
the efficient and proximate cause of the damage.15 
As another example, in Garnett v. Transamerica Insurance 
Services,16 the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to examine a 
similar issue. The policy in that case contained a lead-in clause 
similar to the one now before the Court which purportedly excluded 
losses "occasioned directly or indirectly by enforcement of any 
ordinance or law."17 The insurer had denied coverage because 
certain repairs to the damaged property were required by a building 
code.18 In finding for the insured, the Court held: 
As we read this provision it does not limit 
Transamerica's obligation for the cost of repair or 
replacement of the building when a loss has occurred that 
is covered by the policy, but merely states if the loss 
itself is caused by an ordinance or law, there is no 
coverage. For instance, if some safety improvement of a 
building to which no other loss had occurred were 
required by an ordinance or law, Transamerica would not 
be liable. However, when the cost of repairing or 
replacing a building that had been damaged by fire is 
increased by the requirements of an ordinance or law, 
Transamerica is not relieved of that cost.19 
15See also Garvev v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. . 48 Cal. 
3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989) (when determining 
whether insurance coverage exists under an "all-risk" homeowners 
policy when the loss to the insured property can be attributed to 
two causes, one of which is a non-excluded peril, and the other is 
an excluded peril, the courts are to find coverage only if the non-
excluded is the efficient proximate cause of the loss). 
16800 P.2d 656 (Idaho 1990). 
17Id. at 662 
18 Id, 
19 Id. at 666. 
7 
The Idaho Court's analysis is that where the loss is the 
proximate result of a covered peril, then the lead-in clause does 
not operate to preclude coverage. However, if the sole or 
proximate cause of the loss were an excluded peril, then there 
would be no coverage. 
The same analysis should be applied in the case now before 
this Court. The proximate cause of Alfs1 loss was a covered peril, 
the bursting of a water pipe. The lead-in clause should not be 
applied to defeat coverage when the excluded event, earth movement, 
is not the sole or proximate cause of the loss. 
Point II 
Summary Judgment, as Decided, was Improper 
Because the Determination of Efficient 
Proximate Cause is a Factual Issue Properly 
Decided by the Trier Fact 
A. Efficient Proximate Cause is the Law in Utah 
The Efficient Proximate Cause Rule is set forth in Couch On 
Insurance 2d: 
In determining whether a loss is within an 
exception in a policy, where there is a 
concurrency of different causes, the efficient 
cause—the one that sets others in motion—is 
the cause to which the loss is to be 
attributed, even though the other causes may 
follow it, and operate more immediately in 
producing the disaster.20 
In this case now before this Court, the movement of the earth 
may have operated more immediately in producing the damage, but the 
predominating or efficient proximate cause of the loss was the 
accidental freezing and bursting of the plumbing system. 
20Couch On Insurance 2.d §1466 (emphasis added) . 
8 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this efficient proximate 
cause analysis and applied it to determine the efficient proximate 
cause when multiple, potential causes of damage are advanced: 
The standard definition of proximate cause is 
"that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause), produces the injury and 
without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one 
that necessarily sets in operation the factors 
that accomplish the injury.21 
In Koncilia v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,22 the Colorado 
Supreme Court dealt with the identical issues which are now before 
this Court. In the Koncilia case, the home owners policy insured 
against loss occurring as a result of accidental discharge, leakage 
or overflow of water from a plumbing system. A broken water pipe 
caused water to soak into the ground beneath the house causing the 
ground to subside and the house to settle and crack. Coverage was 
denied on the basis of an exclusion clause containing the 
following: 
(2) caused by, resulting from, contributed to, 
or aggravated by any earth movement including 
but not limited to earthquake, volcanic 
eruption, landslide, mud flow, earth sinking, 
rising or slightly; 
(3) caused by, resulting from, contributed to, 
or aggravated by any of the following: 
. . . 
(c) water below the surface of the ground.23 
21Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 
1985)(quoting State v. Lawson. 688 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1984)). 
22528 P.2d 939 (Colo. App. 1974). 
^Id. at 940. 
9 
In the Koncilia case, the trial court held that the loss had 
been proximately caused by water escaping within the plumbing 
system and was therefore a covered loss. It construed the 
exclusion to apply only to underground water which had not escaped 
from the domestic system or to earth movements caused by anything 
other than accidental discharge from this system. In confirming 
the lower court, the Colorado Supreme Court held: 
When, in determining coverage, the policy 
provisions are inconsistent, or when read 
together they give rise to an ambiguity as to 
the extent of the policy coverage, the 
contract should be construed in favor of 
coverage and against limitations which would 
inure to the benefit of the insurance company 
which, by their draftsmanship created the 
ambiguity. This principle is applicable to 
coverage as well as to exclusions and 
conditions. 
. . . Additionally, if the insurer intended to 
omit from coverage that part of the plumbing 
system which is below the surface of the 
ground when it specifically insures the 
overall plumbing system, it should have done 
so expressly.24 
Likewise, in King v. Travellers Insurance Co.,25 the New 
Mexico Supreme Court analyzed an insurance policy's coverage where 
the policy covered damages to due an accidental discharge from 
within a plumbing system and an exclusion with regard to water 
below the surface of the ground. The parties in the King case 
stipulated that a galvanized line under the floor broke allowing 
water to escape and erode the soil, causing the floor to buckle. 
The insurance company argued that the break in the line was caused 
Id. at 941. 
505 P.2d 1226 (N.M. 1973). 
by electrolysis, a chemical reaction, and therefore was not an 
"accidental discharge," and the resulting damage was from water 
below the surface of the ground. In comparing the policy's 
statement of coverage with the policy's exception clause, the Court 
discussed two alternatives leading to the same result. The 
exception was either an irreconcilable conflict with and repugnant 
to the insurance clause, or must be so construed that its meaning 
will be harmonized with the insuring clause: 
Appellee [insurance company] ignores the fact 
that a great part of many plumbing systems, by 
necessity, are installed below the ground. 
Presumably, if an insurer desires to exclude 
from coverage that part of the plumbing system 
which is below the surface of the ground after 
specifically insuring the overall plumbing 
system, it could have done so.26 
This efficient proximate cause and "fair effect" positions 
have been accepted in the vast majority of jurisdiction where 
court's have confronted these identical issues.27 
Id. at 1232. 
^Ferndale Development Co., v. Great American Insurance Co., 
527 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1974) (holding that the terms "flood" and 
"surface water" in an exclusion clause do not include water 
flooding from a broken valve on a city water line); Broome v. 
Allstate Insurance Co.. 241 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. 1977); New Hampshire 
Insurance Co. v. Robertson. 352 So. 2d 1307 (Miss. 1977) (earth 
movement exclusion relates to natural forces, not from water 
leaking from a plumbing system); Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co. v. Phelps. 294 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1974) (exclusion for "water 
below the surface" does not include coverage of a leak in 
underground plumbing system) ; Contanucci v. Reliance Insurance Co. , 
349 N.Y.S.2d 187 (N.Y. 1973) (exclusion for "water below the 
surface" does not include coverage for a broken a sewer line); 
Thompson v. Occidental Life Insurance Co.. 513 P.2d 353 (Cal. 
1973); Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. North Eastern New 
Mexico Fair Association. 508 P.2d 588 (N.M. 1973); Outdoor World v. 
Continental Casualty Co., 594 P.2d 546 (Az. 1979). 
11 
B. Determination of Efficient Proximate Cause is a 
Matter for the Trier of Fact 
The lower court had a basis for determining that the broken 
water pipe was the efficient proximate cause of the damage. 
However, the lower court had no basis in the stipulated facts and 
the findings of fact for a conclusion of law that earth movement 
was the efficient proximate cause. 
Because the question of whether an included risk or an 
excluded risk was the efficient proximate cause of the damage is a 
question for the trier of fact, the lower court erred in granting 
summary judgment for State Farm. "Coverage should be determined by 
a jury under an efficient proximate cause of analysis. Accordingly, 
bearing in mind the facts here, we conclude the question of 
causation is for the jury to decide."28 In the Von Per Leith case, 
the California Supreme Court reiterated, "{T}he question of what 
caused the loss is generally a question of fact, and the loss is 
not covered if the covered risk is only a remote cause of the loss, 
or the excluded risk was the efficient proximate or predominate 
cause. "29 
C. The Stipulation of the Parties does not 
Support a Determination that Earth Movement 
was the Efficient Proximate Cause 
28Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. . 770 P.2d 704, 48 
Cal. 3d, 395, 257 Calf. Rptr. 292, 302-303 (1989). 
29
 Von Per Leith. 2 Calf. Rptr. 2d 183, 189 (Cal. 1991). 
12 
The parties stipulated to certain facts.30 The only facts 
that relate to the issue of efficient proximate cause are as 
follows: 
5. On or about February 15, 1989, while this 
policy was in full force and effect, and 
during a time when the home was fully occupied 
by Plaintiffs and not under construction, the 
main water line to the home, in an area where 
it runs under the tennis court of the 
Plaintiffs' and to the residence, froze and 
burst as a result of unusually low 
temperatures occurring in the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah.. 
6. As a result of the freezing and bursting 
of the main water line, large volumes of water 
escaped [sic] from the water line causing 
extensive flooding and washing away of soil 
undermining the tennis court, driveway and 
fences and other structures on Plaintiffs1 
premises and causing damage thereto.31 
As argued in the first point of this brief, the only plausible 
interpretation of these stipulated facts, according to the 
definition of efficient proximate cause,32 is that the frozen pipe 
was the efficient proximate cause of the damage. For the lower 
court to have ruled otherwise—if it even addressed the issue of 
efficient proximate cause somewhere between the lines—the lower 
court had to have made a factual determination that the frozen, 
broken pipe was not the efficient proximate cause and that the 
earth movement was the efficient proximate cause. 
^Statement of Facts, R. 40-41. 
31Id. 
32See definition of Efficient Proximate Cause, infra, n. 20 and 
accompanying text. 
In other words, the lower court had (and this Court has) the 
stipulated facts upon which it can rule that the frozen broken 
pipes are the efficient proximate cause of damage. The stipulated 
facts state that the damage occurred "as a result of the freezing 
and bursting of the main water line."33 However, there is no basis 
in the Stipulated Facts upon which the lower court could rule that 
earth movement was the efficient proximate cause. Therefore, the 
lower court, without ignoring the application of efficient 
proximate cause, could not have properly decided this factual 
issue. For the lower court to decide how it did, it had to either 
(1) ignore the application of efficient proximate cause or (2) make 
a determination of fact which was not supported by the parties' 
stipulation or the findings of fact. 
Therefore, Summary Judgment as decided was improper. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
An insured is entitled to the broadest 
protection he could have reasonably understood 
to be provided by the policy.34 
This mandate should underscore this Court's consideration of 
these issues presented on appeal. 
The lower court erred, as a matter of law, in its summary 
judgment ruling because Village Inn v. State Farm is not 
determinative of the issue of law before this Court because it does 
^Stipulated Facts, fl6. 
^Fuller v. Directors of Finance. 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 
1985) . 
14 
not address efficient proximate cause. Alfs advanced the efficient 
proximate cause argument in the lower court, the lower court based 
its Summary Judgment ruling entirely on the Village Inn case, and 
Village Inn does not address the issue of efficient proximate 
cause. According to the stipulated statement of facts and findings 
of fact, the efficient proximate cause is the "freezing and 
bursting of the main water line." 
Further, summary judgment, as decided was improper because 
the determination of efficient proximate cause is a factual issue 
properly decided by the trier of fact. Efficient proximate cause 
is the law, the determination of efficient proximate cause is a 
matter for the trier of fact, and the stipulation of the parties 
does not support a determination that earth movement was the 
efficient proximate cause. Therefore, Summary Judgment as decided 
was improper. 
We therefore respectfully request a reversal of the lower 
court's summary judgment ruling, a ruling that the frozen and 
broken pipes were the efficient proximate cause of the damages, an 
application of the strictissimi juris rule against State Farm and 
a remand to determine damages. 
Dated this 27th day of July, 1992. 
FETZER, HENDRICKSON & SIMONSEN 
Patrick S. Hendrickson 
15 
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